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offshore outsourcinG of many of the activities of the firm 
has become a major issue of concern in welfare economics, politics, 
business management, and international business scholarship. From 
both practical and scholarly perspectives, though, we must recognize 
that this is not a new phenomenon, and that neither outsourcing nor 
offshoring is necessarily the problem that has been represented in the 
popular and scholarly press (Contractor et al., 2010; Engardio, 2006). 
The production of goods in locations other than those in which they 
are sold has been an established strategy of multinational firms for de-
cades—as has the subset of situations in which offshore locations are 
used to produce for home country consumption. “Traditional” situations 
such as Nike moving shoe manufacturing to Asia have become com-
monplace and attract little attention. However, the dramatic increase of 
offshore service provision since 2000 was unexpected, affects the sort 
of knowledge work that was to be the refuge of the developed world, 
and imposes international competition on firms, jobs, and markets that 
had been seen as exempt—and has attracted new attention. In a simi-
lar vein, we are finding that offshore outsourcing is expanding rapidly 
in “new era” sectors such as alternative energy. Even as the science and 
engineering of alternative energy emerge from Western university labs, 
companies hoping to exploit these new ideas are finding not only that 
overseas manufacturing is less expensive but also that only countries 
like China retain the capacity to manufacture such goods. Perhaps we 
should take a longer look at offshore outsourcing to see what it can of-
fer us both as scholars and as business practitioners—but without the 
distractions of populist hysteria.
This article addresses three issues where we international business 
scholars, collectively, could benefit from cooling down and considering 
what we already know about international markets and multinational 
firms rather than pursuing “hot” topics. First, I suggest that by focus-
ing on the narrow issue of producing offshore for the domestic mar-
ket, whether goods or services, scholars are adding to the overheated, 
even jingoistic, discussion of the issue and also are losing opportunities 
to gain theoretical and empirical insights. Second, the general lack of 
strategic perspective on the topic has put the focus on cost-reduction 
through location in emerging economies and has led to fears for un-
differentiated wholesale relocation of value-production to these coun-
tries. Third, convergence on a 2x2 matrix of in-house versus outsourced 
operations and of on- versus off-shore locations has led to a focus on 
corner solutions that lock discussion into black-and-white consider-
ations of what is happening as opposed to measured concern for the 
strategic whys, wheres, and hows. 
The Global Firm and Intra-firm (or Intra-network) 
Trade
The offshoring discussion focuses on the eventuality that a domestic 
firm sends some portion of its value-adding activities, whether manu-
facturing, business processes, or software writing, to another country 
while continuing to sell its output into the domestic market. This leaves 
the domestic customer in the position of transferring money to foreign 
producers rather than to locals, thus draining liquidity out of the do-
mestic economy—or so the story goes. This picture leaves little room 
for the growing phenomenon of the global firm. Rather, we should con-
sider the overall reliance of global markets on networks of international 
trade and investment. If a global firm generates value—whether in 
product design, manufacturing, service support, distribution, market-
ing, customer service, or any other activity—in multiple differentiated 
locations around the world (or even within one or more regions of that 
world), uses intra-firm trade of intermediate goods and services to tie 
together its operations into an efficient whole, and then sells unique 
mixes of goods and services in multiple differentiated markets around 
the world (or region), just what makes the provision of some of these 
products to the original home market unique?
The reality of international trade and investment is that most flows of 
capital and goods and services are managed by multinational firms. 
Indeed, the levels of intra-industry and intra-firm trade and of foreign 
direct investment traditionally have been used to characterize the glob-
al scope of industries and firms (Kobrin, 1991). What is clear in today’s 
marketplace is that better communication technology and increasingly 
sophisticated views of value-adding activities are allowing global firms 
to disaggregate or finely slice their activities and to more easily source 
intermediate goods from the most efficient location—much as Bruce 
Kogut prescribed in 1985 (Kogut, 1985). Indeed, using comparative 
advantage, or location-tied superior productivity, as a key basis for com-
petitive advantage, or firm-specific production efficiency, is the great 
strength of the multinational firm.
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Prahalad and Doz’s (1987) early characterization of the globally efficient 
multinational assumes centralized production facilities, but not neces-
sarily home-country production. Bartlett and Ghoshal’s discussion of 
differentiated subsidiary roles in the transnational firm (1989) clearly 
supposes that subsidiaries in some markets will create significant value 
that will be incorporated in products sold in others—or at home. Sepa-
rating value generation from value consumption is a part of the issue, 
as is the idea of firms sourcing value from multiple locations, as is the 
reality of many ways of coordinating internationally dispersed, disag-
gregated value-adding activities. However, such production was never 
assumed to be only for the home mar-
ket; rather it is production for a global or 
regional market. In the case, for instance, 
of US multinational firms setting up pro-
duction facilities in a few Western Euro-
pean sites to serve the entire Western 
European market, the home country is 
on neither end of the production-con-
sumption equation. Likewise, business services moved abroad as part 
of the overhead activities of local and regional headquarters, which 
would be expected to locate service and support activities at their loca-
tions.
Despite all the discussion, offshoring seems to be explained largely by 
comparative advantage, albeit a sophisticated version in which differ-
entiated inputs are clearly recognized, and communication and gover-
nance technologies through which geographically distant operations 
can be integrated. However, consideration of the developing model of 
the global firm as a differentiated network of distinct subsidiaries, affili-
ates, alliances, and contracts all tied together by a small headquarters 
focused on communication and coordination rather than command 
and control offers a variety of new directions in organizational eco-
nomics and management theory. The responses of global firms to the 
demands of international markets and international sources of prod-
ucts in an increasingly complex global setting offer arrays of strategies 
and organizations that are changing concepts of management and of 
organizational and management theory. 
Strategic Purpose and Core Competency
The two-dimensional characterization of offshoring and outsourcing 
focuses on location and transaction governance, but ignores issues of 
strategic purposes and capabilities—the discussion is one of outcomes, 
not of inputs or drivers. Firms are likely to have strong capabilities and 
stocks of resources in those parts of the value-adding chain that are at 
their strategic core. In other value-adding steps, any individual firm may 
have fewer resources or less effective capabilities, and strategic man-
agement scholars are largely united in proposing that such activities 
should be located in other, more competent, firms. The idea that a com-
plete value-adding chain, from idea to final sale, should be internalized 
within a single economic entity is essentially obsolete—yet discussions 
of outsourcing seem to treat this as the preferred norm. I find that in 
overlaying a strategic perspective on the location x governance matrix, 
an obvious outcome is that core strategies and resources are likely to 
be kept internal to the firm, while market means, based on price and 
supplier reliability, are ideal for delivering generic inputs. However, a 
large proportion of the assets and capabilities deployed by any firm fall 
between these extremes—they are complementary or co-specialized 
assets. That is, they will be essential to the firm’s ability to actually gener-
ate economic rents from its truly unique firm-specific assets, even if the 
firm does not expect to gain advantage based on these assets them-
selves. Improvements in IT and contracting and the rise of reliable part-
ner firms from low-cost locations together have made access to such 
assets through networks of alliances much more likely than in the past.
Strategy is also relevant to the location issue. Comparative advantage 
is alive and well—not just as a cost minimization consideration, but 
as a net value-producing process. From a strategic perspective, a core 
activity may well be kept close to the core location, but twenty years of 
discussion of transnational strategies suggests that the core for any par-
ticular business may not be in the home country—the strategic leader 
subsidiary is a fact as well as an ideal. There is no inherent reason in 
today’s world to assume that strategic leadership comes from the home 
country or that the home market is the dominant focus of the firm. 
Global firms such as Hewlett Packard or DuPont or General Electric do 
not necessarily headquarter every business in the same country, state, 
city, or building as the corporate headquarters, and have not done so 
for some time. A production site with a set of country-specific advan-
tages that offer unique value in combination with the firm-specific re-
sources and capabilities of a particular multinational company could 
well become a regional or global center for value-added production 
(Birkinshaw, 2001; Rugman, 1981). Such a site may certainly supply the 
home market, but perhaps only as a small part of its overall mission. 
Here, There, or Everywhere? A Matter of Distance
My third concern is that even though the focus of the offshoring/out-
sourcing discussion has been on location factors and transactional 
governance, analysis of these structural issues is underdeveloped. 
The presentation of the business process offshoring/outsourcing deci-
sion has devolved into a 2x2 matrix, contrasting in/outsourcing with 
on/offshoring (see Fig. 1). This is certainly a major improvement on the 
five-year-ago discussion that commonly confused where an activity 
was happening with who was doing it, but it reflects a disregard for 
extensive and carefully developed bodies of work on locations and 
continued from page 3
“   There is no inherent reason in today’s world to assume that strategic leadership comes from the home country . . .”
Vol. 11, No. 1  AIB Insights   5
internalization. Looking first at the location question, we should see 
that this simple approach tends to exaggerate both the risks and 
the benefits of offshoring. A first consideration is that “offshore” as a 
generic indicator of any and all non-home country locations com-
moditizes foreign locations—if you are not at home, you are simply off-
shore. Therefore, if “home” is high on familiarity and low on risk, “away” 
tends to become the opposite—even if this is not the intent of the 
original modeler. The “near-shore” construct suggests that this outcome 
is becoming recognized, but really reduces the issue to geographical 
distance—suggesting for instance that Canada and Mexico represent 
similar distances from “home” for a US-based firm. Do we believe this? 
As every basic international business textbook is at pains to discuss, 
the economic, cultural, and institutional contexts of international busi-
ness vary from country to country in varied and complex fashion. At a 
minimum, this dichotomy should be replaced by a multi-faceted “Inter-
national Distance” dimension, whether the CAGE model proposed by 
Ghemawat (2007) or some other version. 
At the same time, the benefits of foreign location tend to be exag-
gerated, so (and again from the US position that is so often assumed) 
that cost differences, as the most apparent expression of comparative 
advantage, become the primary, even only, benefit to be set against 
the uncertainties of the foreign. However, as a variety of scholars have 
begun to emphasize (Doh et al., 2009), while costs do matter in offshor-
ing, they are never the entire story. So, while place matters, whether 
seeking an offshore value production platform or foreign market entry, 
it must be recognized and incorporated into models as a complex and 
multifarious construct of location specific characteristics and degrees 
of distance from both home country and market, not a simple ”here vs. 
there” comparison!
Make-Buy or Make-Ally-Buy?
The other side of the location x governance matrix relates to who owns 
and controls the activity in question. This is typically represented as a 
“make-buy” decision in which the value-adding activity is either inter-
nalized, whether at home or abroad, or outsourced to a supplier in a 
market transaction. This dichotomy is reminiscent of the early market-
hierarchy choice presented in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 
1985), though the outsourcing model assumes that an activity is initially 
pursued inside the company and is moved into the market only when 
it is less expensive or can be done better by an outsourcing special-
ist—how it came to be inside the firm is not at issue. The make-buy 
comparison suggests that outsourcing is done in a market transaction. 
As such, the transactional costs of markets, particularly from investing 
in transaction-specific assets, described by Williamson and others, make 
the outsourcing choice seem particularly high risk. Presuming that the 
decision has been made to outsource, the focal firm then should mini-
mize its risks by avoiding transaction-specific investments—but this is 
likely to make the outsourcing transaction inefficient and may risk a 
poor fit between supplier and client, trading one cost for another.
A generation of work on alliances suggests that the “make-buy” decision 
is in reality a “make-rent-buy” question, in which access to the services 
of certain competences can be managed through a wide array of coop-
erative governance choices. Indeed, in most non-internalized offshor-
ing transactions, the client and the provider engage in a time-extensive, 
semi-customized, more-or-less flexible relationship that evolves over 
time—or what is commonly called an alliance, whether an extended 
contract or an equity joint venture. From a resource-based perspective 
(Madhok & Tallman, 1998), alliances permit firms to focus on applying 
their most specialized resources and capabilities, those that offer the 
greatest potential for generating economic rents, while outsourcing 
other critical activities to alliance or joint venture partners that special-
continued on page 6
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Figure 1: The Offshoring/Outsourcing Matrix or “Make/Buy–Here/There”
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ize in those areas (see Fig. 2). By investing in transaction and partner 
specific resources, both sides can consistently improve the efficiency of 
their complementary sets of assets while making abandonment of the 
relationship consistently more costly and thereby providing protection 
from opportunism. How often do real companies actually buy critical 
services, say payroll administration, in a one-time, arms-length trans-
action based on price/performance that is re-bid on a frequent basis? 
Recognition that outsourcing is primarily carried out through alliance 
transactions changes the risk-return relationships that are expressed in 
the stark make-buy choice. It also opens up the scholarship relating to 
outsourcing to influence from the extensive literature on cooperative 
strategies, particularly international alliances and joint ventures, which 
addresses in considerable detail most of the governance concerns 
expressed about outsourcing.
Offshoring/Outsourcing Is Not New
The effort to treat offshoring/outsourcing as a new or unique strategic 
action has resulted in its apparent lack of success in developing theory 
or advancing the study of either internationalization or strategic man-
agement beyond observation and simple empirical studies. This same 
attitude toward the phenomenon limits the potential for scholarship 
to say much of value to managers—who are already deeply engaged 
in international sourcing and quickly learning when, where, and how 
to pursue it in practice. Right now, the literature tells managers who 
are engaged in deconstructing their firms’ value chains and seeking 
to maximize efficiency and effectiveness through supplier networks 
and through judicious use of foreign locations that they can gain from 
accessing comparative advantage in location choice and from consid-
ering outsourcing non-critical activities. But they already know those 
things! If scholars are going to add to the conversation, to provide 
value to practice, they must do so by connecting current phenomena 
to much-better-understood historic happenings and concepts. If we 
can apply what we know about multinational firms and their capabili-
ties and strategies as they interact with the vagaries and challenges of 
the global economy, we should be able to offer recommendations for 
action and predictions of performance to practitioners. If we continue 
to look at offshoring and outsourcing as unique, isolated, modern phe-
nomena, we will end up as catalogers and scolds, but with little to offer 
either to practice or, in the end, to scholarship.
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